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Abstract
We provide a refoundation of the symmetric growth equilibrium character-
izing the research sector of vertical R&D-driven growth models. We argue that
the usual assumptions made in this class of models leave the agents indi⁄erent
as to where targeting research: hence, the problem of the allocation of R&D in-
vestment across sectors is indeterminate. By introducing an ￿"￿contamination
of con￿dence￿in the expected distribution of R&D investment, we prove that
the symmetric structure of R&D investment is the unique rational expectations
equilibrium compatible with ambiguity-averse agents adopting a maximin strat-
egy.
Keywords: R&D-Driven Growth Models, Indeterminacy, Ambiguity, "￿contamination.
JEL Classi￿cation: 032, 041, D81.
1 Introduction
Most vertical R&D-driven growth models (such as Grossman-Helpman [9], Segerstrom
[12], Aghion-Howitt [1]) focus on the symmetric equilibrium in the research sector, that
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1is, on that path characterized by an equal size of R&D investment in each industry.
In these models the engine of growth is technological progress, which stems from R&D
investment decisions taken by pro￿t-maximizing agents. By means of research, each
product line can be improved an in￿nite number of times, and the ￿rms manufacturing
the most updated version of a product monopolize the relative market and thus earn
positive pro￿ts. These pro￿ts have a temporary nature since any monopolistic producer
is doomed to be displaced by successive improvements in its product line. The level
of expected pro￿ts together with their expected duration, as compared to the cost of
research, determines the pro￿tability of undertaking R&D in each line.
The plausibility of the symmetric equilibrium requires that each R&D industry be
equally pro￿table, so that the agents happen to be indi⁄erent as to where targeting
their investment (Grossman and Helpman [9], p.47). The pro￿t-equality requirement
implies two di⁄erent conditions. First, the pro￿t ￿ ows deriving from any innovation
need to be the same for each industry: this is guaranteed by assuming that all the
monopolistic industries share the same cost and demand conditions. Second, the mo-
nopolistic position acquired by innovating needs to be expected to last equally long
across sectors: this requires that the agents expect the future amount of research to be
equally distributed among the di⁄erent sectors. As is well known to the reader famil-
iar with the neo-Schumpeterian models of growth, future is allowed to a⁄ect current
(investment) decisions via the forward-looking nature of the Schumpeterian ￿creative
destruction￿e⁄ect.
Expecting equal future pro￿tability across sectors, however, does not constitute a
su¢ cient condition for each agent to choose a symmetric allocation of R&D e⁄orts:
indeed, equal future pro￿tability makes the investor indi⁄erent as to where target-
ing research. As a result, when symmetric expectations are assumed the allocation
problem of investment across product lines is indeterminate. First, notice that this
indeterminacy in the intersectoral allocation of R&D may have powerful e⁄ects on the
equilibrium growth rate in this class of models, as recently pointed out by Cozzi [3,4].
Second, indeterminacy does not depend on the focus on the symmetric equilibrium. In
a recent paper1 Giordani and Zamparelli develop an extension of the standard quality-
ladder model to an economy with asymmetric fundamentals where the equilibrium
allocation of R&D investment turns out to be asymmetric. However, the multiplic-
ity of equilibria still exists, because the source of indeterminacy is not the symmetric
1P. Giordani and L. Zamparelli (2006), ￿The Importance of Industrial Policy in the Quality Ladder
Growth Models￿ , Mimeo.
2structure of the economy but the fact that, in equilibrium, the returns from R&D are
equalized, which still characterizes the asymmetric extension and which, once again,
makes the agents indi⁄erent in the allocation of R&D e⁄orts.
In this paper we provide a way to eliminate indeterminacy in this class of models.
Our reasoning goes as follows: the agents￿indi⁄erence - arising from the equalization
of R&D returns across industries - gives them in principle the possibility of adopting a
whatever (even randomly chosen) investment strategy. This makes these agents highly
uncertain about the con￿guration of future R&D investment, since that con￿guration
is the result of a decision problem analogous to the one they are currently facing. To
represent uncertainty (or ambiguity) and the agents￿attitude towards it, we follow
the maxmin expected utility (MEU) theory axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler
[8]. In representing subjective beliefs this approach suggests to replace the standard
single (additive) prior with a closed and convex set of (additive) priors. The choice
among alternative acts is determined via a maximin strategy, where the minimization
is carried out over the set of priors and is meant to represent the individuals￿aversion
towards ambiguous scenarios. The plausibility of individuals￿aversion to ambiguity (or
preference for ￿pure risk￿ ) has been ￿rst shown by Ellsberg [6] via a thought experiment
(then known as the Ellsberg paradox)2. In particular, we follow the ￿"￿contamination
of con￿dence￿argument, recently axiomatized by Nishimura and Ozaki [11]. As we will
see, a however small ￿contamination of con￿dence￿in the expectations of the future
investment￿allocation annihilates the agents￿indi⁄erence and makes the con￿guration
where R&D returns are equalized across industries emerge as the unique equilibrium.
Importantly, our assumption on the agents￿attitude towards uncertainty does not
concern any fundamental of the economy and is to be interpreted as a way of treat-
ing ￿extrinsic uncertainty￿ . Moreover, uncertainty does not a⁄ect expectations on the
aggregate amount of research. In fact, we introduce uncertainty to eliminate inde-
terminacy arising from situations where agents are indi⁄erent among a set of choices.
This is not the case for the total amount of research: if agents expect the equilibrium
aggregate amount of research, their choice between consumption and savings, which
are channelled to the research sector, is uniquely determined and con￿rms their expec-
tations; there is no indi⁄erence, which is the source of the uncertainty in the agents￿
beliefs. Hence, in order to develop our argument all we need is the description of the
2Abundant experimental evidence supports the idea of the decision-makers￿ambiguity aversion.
See among the others Heath and Tversky [10], Fox and Tversky [7]. See also Camerer and Weber [2]
for a survey.
3R&D sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brie￿ y describe the
basic structure of the R&D sector, with particular reference to the Segerstrom￿ s [12]
formalization3. In Section 3 we explain the core of our argument, enunciate and prove
the proposition.
2 The R&D Sector
In this Section we provide a description of the vertical innovation sector, which is basi-
cally common to most neo-Schumpeterian growth models. This sector is characterized
by the e⁄orts of R&D ￿rms aimed at developing better versions of the existing prod-
ucts in order to displace the current monopolists. We assume a continuum of industries
indexed by ! over the interval [0;1]. There are free entry and perfect competition in
each R&D race. Firms employ labor and produce, through a constant returns tech-
nology, a Poisson arrival rate of innovation in the product line they target. Adopting
Segerstrom￿ s [12] notation, any ￿rm j hiring lj units of labor in industry ! at time t
acquires the instantaneous probability of innovating Alj=X(!;t), where X(!;t) is the
industry-speci￿c R&D di¢ culty index.
Since independent Poisson processes are additive, the speci￿cation of the innova-
tion process implies that the industry-wide instantaneous probability of innovation is
ALI(!;t)=X(!;t) ￿ I(!;t), where LI(!;t) =
P
j lj(!;t). The function X(!;t) de-
scribes the evolution of technology; as in Segerstrom [12], we assume it to evolve in
accordance with:
￿
X(!;t)
X(!;t)
= ￿I(!;t)
where ￿ is a positive constant. Then, by substituting for I(!;t) into the expression
above and solving the di⁄erential equation for X(!;t) we get:
X(!;t) = X(!;t0) + ￿A
t R
t0
LI(!;z)dz:
Whenever a ￿rm succeeds in innovating, it acquires the uncertain pro￿t ￿ ow that
accrues to a monopolist, that is, the stock market valuation of the ￿rm: let us denote
it by v(!;t). Thus, the problem faced by an R&D ￿rm is that of choosing the amount
of labor input in order to maximize its expected pro￿ts4:
3Notice however that our argument can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the whole class of models.
4As usual, let us consider labor as the numeraire.
4max
lj
[v(!;t)Alj=X(!;t) ￿ lj];
which provides a ￿nite, positive solution for lj only when the arbitrage equation
v(!;t)A=X(!;t) = 1 is satis￿ed. Notice that in this case, though ￿nite, the size of the
￿rm is indeterminate because of the constant returns research technology5.
The ￿rm￿ s market valuation at a given instant t, v(!;t), is the expected discounted
value of its pro￿t ￿ ows from t to +1:
v(!;t) =
+1 R
t
￿(s)exp
￿
￿
s R
t
[r(￿) + I(!;￿)]d￿
￿
ds:
By plugging I(!;￿) into v(!;t), we ￿nally obtain the following expression for v(!;t):
v(!;t) =
+1 R
t
￿(s)exp
8
> > > <
> > > :
￿
s R
t
2
6
6 6
4
r(￿) +
ALI(!;￿)
X(!;t0) + ￿A
￿ R
t0
LI(!;z)dz
3
7 7 7
5
d￿
9
> > > =
> > > ;
ds: (1)
The usual focus on the symmetric growth equilibrium is based on the assumption
that the R&D intensity I(!;￿) is the same in all industries ! and strictly positive.
The suggestion of a new rationale for this symmetric behavior is the topic of the next
Section.
3 The Refoundation of the Symmetric Equilibrium
Assume that the agent is (1￿p)100% sure to face in the future a symmetric con￿gura-
tion of R&D investment, and that with probability p any other possible con￿guration
can occur. We can call this situation a ￿p￿contamination of con￿dence￿ 6. Aversion
to uncertainty in this context implies that with probability p the agent expects the
5In the next Section our focus will be on the individuals￿investment decisions, the reason being
that R&D ￿rms are actually ￿nanced by consumers￿savings, which are channeled to them through
the ￿nancial market. Thus the role of these ￿rms is merely that of transforming these savings into
research activity.
6To avoid confusion let us remark that in the literature this situation is usually called
"￿contamination (which is also the phrase used in the Introduction). However, as we will see, in
our context " stands for the extension of the state space.
5worst con￿guration of future investment, that is, the one which minimizes her expected
returns7. Since the minimizing con￿guration is a function of the agent￿ s investment
choice, this choice can then be formalized as the result of a ￿two-player zero-sum game￿
characterized by:
￿ the minimizing behavior of a ￿malevolent Nature￿ , which selects the worst pos-
sible con￿guration of future R&D e⁄orts and
￿ the maximizing behavior of the agent, who selects the best possible con￿guration
of current R&D e⁄orts.
We start our analysis at the beginning of time t = t0, and assume that, at this
time, all industries share the same di¢ culty index X(!;t0) = X(t0) 8! 2 [0;1] in
order to focus on the role of expectations on the kind of equilibrium that will prevail.
Our problem can then be stated as follows. At time t = t0, the agent is asked to
allocate a certain amount of R&D investment among all the existing industries: in
maximizing her expected pay-o⁄, she will take into account the minimizing strategy
that a ￿malevolent Nature￿will be carrying out in choosing the composition of future
R&D e⁄orts. We denote with lm(!;t0) ￿ lm(t0)[1 + ￿(!)] the agent￿ s investment in
sector ! at time t0, and with LI(!;t) ￿ LI(t)[1+"(!)] the agent￿ s expectations about
the aggregate research in sector ! at a generic point in time t. lm(t0) and LI(t) are,
respectively, the agent￿ s average investment per sector at t0 and the expected average
research per sector at a generic t. "(￿) and ￿(￿) represent relative deviations from these
averages satisfying:
1 Z
0
"(!)d! = 0;
1 Z
0
￿(!)d! = 0 and "(!) ￿ ￿1; ￿(!) ￿ ￿1:
7See the representation theorem (theorem 1) in Nishimura and Ozaki [11] for an axiomatization of
the choice behavior assumed here.
6The presence of the two functions ￿(￿) and "(￿) is intended to allow for asymmetry in
the agent￿ s current and expected investment8 9. Note that ￿(￿) and "(￿) are unbounded
above because the zero-measure of each sector allows the investment in any of them to
be however big, without violating the constraint on the total R&D investment. From
now on we will drop the argument t0 in the expression for10 lm(!;t0) and enunciate the
following:
Proposition 1 For a however small probability (p) of deviation ("(!)) from symmet-
ric expectations on the future R&D investment, decision makers adopting a maxmin
strategy to solve their investment allocation problem, choose a symmetric investment
strategy, i.e. lm[1 + ￿(!)] = lm 8! 2 [0;1]. The associated distribution of expected
R&D e⁄orts among sectors is: LI(t)[1 + "(!)] = LI(t) 8! 2 [0;1].
Proof. If we substitute for LI(!;t) ￿ LI(t)[1 + "(!)] into (1), and use the condition
1 R
0
￿(!)d! = 0, our problem can be stated as:
max
￿(￿)
8
> > <
> > :
(1 ￿ p)lm
A
X(t0)
+1 R
t0
￿(s)exp
2
6 6
4￿
s R
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0
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￿ R
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Ad￿
3
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0
lm[1 + ￿(!)]
A
X(t0)
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9
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d!
9
> > =
> > ;
8These de￿nitions imply:
1 R
0
LI(t)[1 + "(!)]d! = LI(t) = L(t)
1 R
0
lm(t)[1 + ￿(!)]d! = L(t)lm(t)
where L(t) denotes the mass of agents in the economy at time t. With reference to Section 2 the
following relation between lj and lm holds:
1 R
0
P
j lj (!;t)d! = L(t)lm(t):
9As in the standard quality-ladder models, here the agent is still assumed to be risk-averse, and
to able to completely diversify her portfolio - by means of the intermediation of costless ￿nancial
institutions. In fact, in order to carry out this diversi￿cation, it is su¢ cient to allocate investments
in a non-zero measure interval of R&D sectors (and not necessarily in the whole of them), according
to a measure that is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure of the sector space.
Ambiguity here a⁄ects the mean return of the R&D investment and not its volatility, against which
the agent has already completely hedged.
10As we show below, this does not result in any loss of generality.
7s:t:
1 Z
0
"(!)d! = 0;
1 Z
0
￿(!)d! = 0;
￿(!) 2 [￿1;1); "(!) 2 [￿1;1):
Notice that the ￿rst addend of the maximand is constant with respect to ￿(￿) and
"(￿), so that it does not a⁄ect the solution of the problem.
This problem admits the same solution for a however small probability p. In order
to prove that the unique equilibrium is given by ￿(!) = "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0;1], we will
proceed through the following steps (the reader can refer to Figure 1, where c1,c2,c3,c4
represent the agent￿ s pay-o⁄s).
1. We will ￿rst prove that, if the agent plays a symmetric strategy, ￿(!) = 0
8! 2 [0;1], then the worst harm Nature can in￿ ict to the agent is also associated with
a symmetric strategy, "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0;1] (that is, with reference to Figure 1: c1 < c2).
2. We will then prove that, if Nature chooses "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0;1], the pay-o⁄ the
agent will obtain is independent of her investment strategy (that is, c1 = c3).
3. We will ￿nally show that, if the agent plays an asymmetric strategy, ￿(!) 6= 0
in a non-zero measure set, then the worst harm Nature can in￿ ict to the agent is also
associated with an asymmetric strategy, "(!) 6= 0 in a non-zero measure set (with
reference to Figure 1: c4 < c3).
Then the con￿guration given by ￿(!) = "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0;1] will emerge as the
unique equilibrium of the zero-sum game (since c2 > c1 = c3 > c4). Let us proceed
step by step.
1. (c1 < c2). If ￿(!) = 0 8! 2 [0;1], we ￿rst show that the function:
￿ ￿
1 Z
0
lm
8
> > <
> > :
+1 R
t0
￿(s)exp
2
6 6
4￿
s R
t0
0
B B
@r(￿) +
ALI(￿)[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+￿A
￿ R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1
C
C
Ad￿
3
7
7
5ds
9
> > =
> > ;
d!
is a sum over ! of strictly convex functions in "(!). In fact, set:
f(";￿) ￿ ￿
0
B B
@r(￿) +
ALI(￿)[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+￿A
￿ R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1
C
C
A
8Figure 1: The Game between the Agent and Nature
Since
@2f(";￿)
@"2 > 0, then f(";￿) is strictly convex11. As a result, the function
F(";s) ￿
s R
t0
f(";￿)d￿, as a sum of strictly convex functions, is also strictly convex,
that is:
@2F(";s)
@"2 > 0. Now, for each s 2 [t0;+1], we can de￿ne: H(";s) ￿
lm￿(s)exp[F(";s)]. H(";s) is also strictly convex, being a positive transformation
of the exponential of a strictly convex function; and so it is the sum of all H(";s) over
t 2 [t0;+1). Finally, ￿("(!)) =
1 R
0
+1 R
t0
H(";s)dsd! ￿
1 R
0
G("(!))d! is a sum over ! of
continuous and strictly convex functions, G(￿), of ". Notice that ￿(￿) is an operator
transforming measurable real functions into real numbers, whereas H(￿) and G(￿) are
functions transforming real numbers into real numbers.
Let 0(￿) be the function that is identically equal to zero, i.e. 0(!) = 0 for all
! 2 [0;1]. We want to show that the minimum value of ￿(￿) occurs when "(￿) = 0(￿),
that is, when "(!) = 0, 8! 2 [0;1].
Let !1 = 1
N, !2 = 2
N,..., !N = 1, with N > 0 being an integer number. By
de￿nition of convexity we have:
G(￿1"(!1)+￿2"(!2)+::+￿N"(!N)) ￿ ￿1G("(!1))+￿2G("(!2))+::+￿NG("(!N));
11It is
@2f(";￿)
@"2 =
2A
2LI(￿)￿X(t0)
R ￿
t0 LI(z)dz
￿
A￿(1+"(!))
R ￿
t0 LI(z)dz+X(t0)
￿3 > 0 as "(!) ￿ ￿1:
9with
PN
i=1 ￿i = 1. Let us posit ￿1 = ￿2 = :: = ￿N = 1=N, then we have:
G
￿XN
i=1 "(!i)
1
N
￿
￿
1
N
XN
i=1 G("(!i)):
By the continuity of G(￿) and the de￿nition of integral, it is:
lim
N!1
G
￿XN
i=1 "(!i)
1
N
￿
= G
0
@
1 Z
0
"(!)d!
1
A ￿ lim
N!1
1
N
XN
i=1 G("(!i)) =
1 Z
0
G("(!))d!:
Noting that
1 R
0
"(!)d! = 0 and that
1 R
0
G(0)d! = G(0) it follows that:
￿(0(￿)) =
1 Z
0
G
￿Z 1
0
"(!)d!
￿
d! = G(0) ￿
1 Z
0
G("(!))d! = ￿("(!))
for all measurable functions "(￿). This implies that "(￿) = 0(￿) is the minimizing
con￿guration of " satisfying
1 R
0
"(!)d! = 0: The pay-o⁄, obtained by setting "(!) =
￿(!) = 0 8! 2 [0;1] in ￿ is then the one that the agent can surely obtain if she plays
a symmetric strategy.
2. (c1 = c3). If "(!) = 0, 8! 2 [0;1], then the agent would be totally indi⁄erent in
the allocation of her R&D e⁄orts. In fact, the maximum problem obtained by setting
"(!) = 0 8! 2 [0;1] is (under the usual constraints):
max
￿(￿)
1 Z
0
lm[1 + ￿(!)]
+1 R
t0
￿(s)exp
2
6 6
4￿
s R
t0
0
B B
@r(￿) +
ALI(￿)
X(t0)+￿A
￿ R
t0
LI(z)dz
1
C
C
Ad￿
3
7
7
5dsd!;
which, since
1 R
0
￿(!)d! = 0, always gives the same constant value:
lm
+1 R
t0
￿(s)exp
2
6 6
4￿
s R
t0
0
B B
@r(￿) +
ALI(￿)
X(t0)+￿A
￿ R
t0
LI(z)dz
1
C C
Ad￿
3
7 7
5ds:
3. (c4 < c3). Assume ￿(!) 6= 0 for some non zero measure set of ! 2 [0;1]. Then
the Nature￿ s minimum problem with respect to "(￿) can be stated as follows:
min
"(￿)
1 Z
0
lm[1 + ￿(!)]
8
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10s:t:
1 Z
0
"(!)d! = 0
The solution to this problem is "[￿(!)], which is the reaction function of Nature,
that is, its optimal (minimizing) response to any possible value of ￿(!). We do not
need, however, to ￿nd it explicitly since our conclusion follows straightforwardly. We
can build the Lagrangian and then derive the ￿rst-order conditions (f.o.c.):
L =
1 Z
0
lm[1+￿(!)]
8
> > <
> > :
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0
"(!)d!
For every ! 2 [0;1], the f.o.c. with respect to " are:
lm[1 + ￿(!)]
+1 R
t0
￿(s)exp
2
6 6
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Ad￿
3
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￿
"
￿
s R
t0
ALI(￿)X(t0)
￿
X(t0)+￿A(1+"(!))
R ￿
t0 LI(z)dz
￿2d￿
#
= ￿￿
It results that, if ￿(!) 6= 0 for some ! 2 [0;1], and if the constraint
1 R
0
￿(!)d! = 0
holds, the necessary conditions for a minimum can never be satis￿ed if "[￿(!)] = 0
8! 2 [0;1]12.
The intuition of the result is as follows. Under symmetric expectations (" = 0) the
agent is indi⁄erent as to where targeting her investment (c1 = c3); this has been the
starting point of our paper. The agent also knows that, when investing symmetrically,
the corresponding pay-o⁄ (c1) is also the minimum that she can obtain: in fact, if
future investment turns out to be asymmetric (" 6= 0) she will be better o⁄ (c2 > c1)
given the convexity of the pay-o⁄ function in ". On the contrary, when allocating
investment asymmetrically (￿ 6= 0), even with a slight probability (p ! 0) that a future
non-symmetric distribution will arise (" 6= 0), our agent will expect to be targeting
above average exactly those sectors that will subsequently experience above average
innovative e⁄orts, thus lowering the expected payo⁄ as compared to the symmetric
investment case (c4 < c3). As a result, since the worst that can happen while investing
12In fact, consider an economy with only two sectors, !1,!2. If it were "(!1) = "(!2) = 0, the
satisfaction of the f.o.c. and the constraint would require ￿(!1) = ￿(!2) and ￿(!1) + ￿(!2) = 0,
which proves that there cannot exist ! where ￿(!) 6= 0:
11symmetrically (c1) is always better than the worst that can happen while choosing a
(whatever) asymmetric allocation of investment (c4), our ￿cautious￿agent will always
strictly prefer the ￿rst option.
Notice that the fact that the symmetric equilibrium is being derived at the beginning
of time t = t0 does not result in any loss of generality. In fact, this equilibrium
guarantees that the di¢ culty index X(!;t) starts growing at the same rate - and is
therefore always equal - across sectors. This condition in turn assures that, at any
point in time t, the agent continuously faces a decision problem equivalent to the one
we have analyzed and, hence, continuously ￿nds the same optimal (symmetric) solution.
Notice also that our result holds even when the ￿punishment power￿of Nature ("(!))
is restricted to be however small. The proof is straightforward: given "(!) 2 [￿￿;￿]
8￿ 2 (0;1), steps 1 and 2 of the proof are clearly una⁄ected. For step 3 notice that
"(!) = 0 is always an inner point of the domain and, hence, the non-ful￿llment of the
f.o.c. guarantees that it is not a minimum.
We have shown that, even though the agent is ￿almost sure￿(p ! 0) of facing a
symmetric con￿guration of future investment (which would leave her in a position of
indi⁄erence in her current allocation problem), the mere possibility of a slightly di⁄erent
con￿guration (" ! 0) makes her strictly prefer to equally allocate her investment across
sectors. The symmetric equilibrium then emerges as the unique optimal investment
allocation.
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